what he took his distinctive contribution to be, or what was his true self-conception as a philosopher.
In asking about of the true self-conception of Descartes, or of any philosopher, we are moving to a richer and more positive sense of the term persona, one that takes us away from masks and acting towards something more 'personal', something connected not just with a 'career', but with the full moral and psychological dimensions of someone's chosen form of life. For alongside its ancient theatrical connotations, the Latin concept persona also has deeper and more serious resonances, deriving in part from early-Christian theology. Tres personae in una substantia ('three persons in one substance') was Tertullian's formula in the third century for defining the unity and triplicity of God, persona being (in Hugh Pyper's apt phrase) 'a label for whatever accounts for the distinctive identity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit'. 10 Without going into the intricate theological controversies surrounding the mystery of the Trinity, one way in which the individual personae have long been understood is by analogy with the way in which a human being forms a true selfconception of him or herself. 11 For our present purposes, the persona of the philosopher may thus be said to involve the development and expression of a particular distinctive identity or sense of self-that which gives intellectual shape and moral significance to that individual's life and work.
PHILOSOPHICAL SELF-CONCEPTIONS AND THEIR EVOLUTION
The self-conception of the philosopher in something like the above sense was, until our own time, a serious and important matter-something we tend to forget in our philosophically somewhat degenerate age. A culture manifests its degeneration in part by bad faith, a telling instance of which is the undertaking of some philosophical pursuit not for itself, but merely instrumentally, for the sake of the practitioner's vanity or some other advantage. The sophists of ancient Greece, who claimed to teach virtue for money, were criticized by Socrates as a paradigm case. 12 Contrasted with this instrumental approach is the Platonic ideal of philosophia-love of wisdom for its own sake. 13 Familiarity with the label has perhaps dulled us to the passionate seriousness it originally conveyed-the seriousness that led Socrates, threatened with the death penalty, to insist that 'for a human being, the unexamined life (bios) is not worth living' 14 It is often assumed nowadays that the critical inquiry that is the hallmark of the so-called Socratic method is of a purely logical character, having to do merely with the examination of concepts and definitions. But the oft-quoted slogan cited here should remind us that philosophical 'examination', for Socrates, involves the entire character of someone's life (bios). As Socrates goes on to explain in the Apology, his philosophical vocation was linked with unwavering allegiance to conscience, the 'god', as he put it, whose inner voice demanded his obedience.
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Contrast this moral seriousness with the climate inhabited by many of today's practitioners of philosophy-a climate whose character is aptly indicated by the kinds of questions that seem to claim most attention. How do you know that you are really not sitting in this lecture room, but instead are just a brain floating in a vat of nutrients somewhere in the Andromeda galaxy? May it not be, for all you know, that the planet Earth and all its inhabitants are not real, but mere fantasies produced in your mind by a group of mad scientists in Andromeda, who have stimulated the nerve inputs of your floating brain in such a way as to give you the all the appropriate sensations so as to create the convincing illusion that you are sitting here in Brisbane, on the planet Earth, when in reality you are light years away, and don't have a body at all, and therefore no posterior to sit on in the first place.
Asking this sort of fantastic question might seem as silly a waste of time for grown people as one could imagine. Yet the present writer could testify (as no doubt 12 The criticism is implicit in the heavy irony used by Socrates in his description of the sophists (in the course of his own defence against the accusation of corrupting the young): could many other editors of mainstream anglophone philosophy journals) to receiving scores of submissions each year, highly intricate pieces of work, laboriously examining just one more variation on this brain-in-vat scenario. Our philosophical culture, to be sure, perceives these inquiries as contributions to an important subject called 'epistemology'. But on reflection one may wonder whether this kind of work can be pursued only at the cost of a certain fragmentation, a split between one's job as a 'philosopher', and the more intimate concerns that structure the rest of one's life.
The instrumental value of the work is clear, for on it depend promotions and grants and research ratings and all manner of other appurtenances of modern academic life.
And no doubt the intellectual puzzles involved may have a certain engaging intricacy which can be stimulating in itself, as well as provoking wider reflection on the nature and justification of knowledge claims. Yet for all that, are we not left with a certain sense of disquiet at seeing so much philosophical energy expended on examining the epistemic credentials of a science-fiction hypothesis that no human being, once they get outside the study or the seminar, could even begin to take seriously? One could of course pretend to care about it-pretend that one was passionately involved in making sure we know we are not on Alpha Centauri-but that would be hard to reconcile with the spirit of commitment and integrity which, since Socrates and Plato, has been thought of as fundamental to genuine philosophical inquiry.
In 'epistemological' game-inventing artificial positions (those of the 'the sceptic', the 'antisceptic', the 'realist', the 'antirealist', and so on) to see whether one is ingenious enough to refute the latest ploy in an introverted academic debate. His philosophical concerns had a far greater integrity, a far closer link to the goals of his life.
FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO SCIENCE?
In recent Cartesian scholarship, the long dominant image of Descartes the epistemologist has gradually given way to that of Descartes the scientist. In part, this is a reversion to an earlier view, held for example by the great Cartesian scholar and editor Charles Adam, that Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology are essentially subordinate to Cartesian science. 24 According to an interesting study by Desmond
Clarke published last year, 25 the key motivation behind Descartes's research programme is the desire to provide a new style of explanation that would replace the scholastic approach that prevailed in the world in which he grew up. Much of this is uncontroversial: Descartes frequently complains of the explanatory vacuity of the 'substantial forms and real qualities which many philosophers suppose to inhere in things', 26 objecting that they are 'harder to understand than the things they are supposed to explain'. 27 His own mechanistic accounts, by contrast, were supposed to have an immediate intelligibility, since they simply ascribed to the micro world exactly the same kinds of interactions with which we are familiar from ordinary middle-sized phenomena around us. If we understand the latter, then we already have a grasp of how the posited micro events operate ('imperceptible simply because of their small size'); and Descartes's key idea is that these give rise to the relevant ('Suffice it for now to know that we know nothing at all'); Misera est conditio nostra. In media luce coecutimus ('Wretched is our condition; in the midst of light we are blind'). In F. Can this immaterialist metaphysics be merely a means to an end-a kind of propaedeutic to science in the way suggested by the thesis of Adam? Such a view is not, perhaps, beyond the bounds of possibility, though it would, I believe, be very difficult convincingly to explain the theistic reflections we find in the Third Meditation as simply part of an instrumental strategy; for it is striking that the style and flavour of the writing is often much closer to the language of devotion and worship that it is to the detached critical terminology of the analytician. 38 But there is another and more fundamental reason for being wary of the image of Descartes the scientist as the key to understanding the Cartesian system, and that is that the very notion of 'the scientist' is fundamentally anachronistic when we transpose it back from our own time to the world of the seventeenth century. Descartes was deeply 35 'Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas' ('Go not outside, but return within thyself; in the inward man dwelleth the truth'). Spirit', a doctrine based on the prophecy in Isaiah: 'And the spirit of God shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the sprit of counsel and strength, the spirit of knowledge and godliness, the spirit of the fear of God.' 51 Aquinas observes that four of the gifts pertain to reason, namely wisdom (sapientia), knowledge (scientia), understanding (intellectus) and counsel (consilium); and three to the appetitive faculty, namely strength or courage (fortitudo), godliness or piety (pietas) and fear (timor). 52 The result is that, despite Aquinas's stress on their different origins (natural and supernatural respectively), his discussion involves a considerable overlap, or 'twinning' 53 between the list of intellectual excellences and the list of gifts of the Holy Spirit. And indeed Aquinas's account constantly interweaves items from these lists, and also from other standard theological lists, including the famous enumeration in Paul's letter to the Galatians of the twelve fruits of the Spirit, namely 'love, joy peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance'. 54 Aquinas also cross-refers us to the three great 'theological' virtues of faith, hope and charity: two of the three intellectual virtues, scientia and intellectus are linked with the faith, while sapientia is linked with charity.
This interweaving is particularly striking in the case of sapientia or wisdom:
although if construed in purely secular or natural terms, it might be thought to be a 'morally neutral' virtue, and hence able to be present irrespective of the moral character of the agent, this ceases to be so if it is construed as a spiritual gift. 55 What had in Aristotle been understood in terms of the mastery of the first principles of metaphysics becomes in Aquinas associated with knowledge of the ultimate first principle, God, knowledge of whom is linked in many biblical texts to charity or love 51 Isaiah 11: 2, following the Greek text of the Septuagint version (LXX). The original Hebrew lists six gifts, and this is followed in the Vulgate: 'et requiescet super eum spiritus Domini spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis.' But the LXX version adds a gloss 'the fear of God', which some commentaries construed as a seventh gift; hence the standard doctrine of the 'sevenfold gifts' of the Holy Sprit, reflected in Thomas's inclusion of timor.
52 Summa theologiae, Ia IIae 68, 1.
53 Cf. Stump, Aquinas, pp. 350ff. 54 Galatians 5: 22-3: 'fructus autem Spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, longanimitas, bonitas, benignitas, fides, modestia, continentia' (Vulgate).
55 Summa theologiae, IIa IIae 45, 4.
(which of course is far from being a purely intellectual matter). 56 Some of the ramifications of this are again brought out by Stump:
On Aquinas's account of wisdom . . . a person's moral wrongdoing will produce deficiencies in both her speculative and her practical intellect. In its effects on her speculative intellect, it will make her less capable of understanding God and goodness, theology and ethics. It will also undermine her practical intellect, leaving her prone not only to wrong moral judgment in general, but also to wrong moral judgment about herself and particular actions of hers, and so will lead to self deception.
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The upshot of this is that although a certain image of Aquinas that is prevalent today sees him as a proto-analytic philosopher, concerned purely with abstract conceptual inquiries (together perhaps with certain quaint and abstruse theological puzzles, for example about the identity of angels), in reality his philosophy offers an It belongs to wisdom, as a gift, not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human acts. Now the first thing to be effected in this direction of human acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is said to be 'the beginning of wisdom,' because it makes us shun evil, while the last thing is like an end, whereby all things are reduced to their right order; and it is this that constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that 'the wisdom that is from above' (and this is the gift of the Holy Ghost) 'first indeed is chaste,' because it avoids the corruption of sin, and 'then peaceable,' wherein lies the ultimate effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. 58 . All this might indeed seem to take us very far away from search for wisdom and righteousness associated with the traditional persona of the philosopher as sage.
But it is now time to notice that all these envisaged technical developments in the management of the passions have for Descartes an essentially subordinate role. For the passions are related to the good only, as it were, accidentally and contingently.
Sometimes the objects which they incline us to pursue are indeed worthy of pursuit, 66 but often they can mislead us into supposing that something's value is vastly greater than it is:
Often passion makes us believe certain things to be much better and more desirable than they are; then, when we have taken much trouble to acquire them, 67 Letter to Elizabeth of 1 September 1645. Descartes goes on to say that the passions often 'represent the good to which they tend with greater splendour than they deserve' and they make us imagine pleasure to be much greater before we possess them than our subsequent experiences show them to be.' (AT IV 284: CSMK 264-5). Is what is here envisaged a kind of utilitarian calculus-the kind of rational instrumentalism that we have seen in more modern times, namely one that cuts free from any substantive vision of the good, and simply aims to maximize the 'preferences' of the agent, or of the community at large? Emphatically not. For
Descartes never abandoned his allegiance to a strongly theistic metaphysics of value, one that construes goodness as an objective supra-personal reality, constraining the rational assent of human beings just as powerfully as do the clearly perceived truths of logical and mathematics. Descartes insists, in a strongly Platonic moment, on the closest possible match between how the mind responds to the ratio veri and to the ratio boni. 70 The metaphysical journey from darkness and confusion to divine illumination, whether in the pursuit of truth or of goodness, involves a co-operation between intellect and will:
the will must be exercised first in rejecting what is doubtful and unreliable, and then in focusing attention on the innate indubitable deliverances of the natural light that remain. Once the eye of the soul, the acies mentis, is turned on the relevant objects, they reveal themselves with irresistible clarity to the perceiving intellect as good or as true, and the assent of the will (to affirm, or to pursue) follows automatically: ex magna luce in intellectu sequitur magna propensio in voluntate.
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Once the importance of this powerful underlying metaphysics has been appreciated, we can see that Cartesian ethics, with its proposed techniques for the 69 AT VII 52: CSM II 36. 70 My spontaneous inclination to assent to the truth, or to pursue the good, is a function of my 'clearly understanding that reasons of truth and goodness point that way' (quia rationem veri et boni in ea evidenter intelligo); Descartes suggests that this may also be thought of as resulting from a 'divinely produced disposition of my inmost thoughts' (AT VII 58: CSM II 40).
71 AT VII 59: CSM II 41.
